

(Grant)

(with US forces in Vietnam)

2. Given the costs of pursuing victory in ^(continued) war, the Communists might believe ~~that~~ (rightly or wrongly) their prospects for achieving dominance ^{in South Vietnam} in a political context are good enough to accept a compromise formula, ^(that halts major violence) even one that does not guarantee their success or makes it unlikely in the short run, so long as it leads to US withdrawal.

Basic Issues — caps

The key issues requiring judgement are:

1. Is the maintenance of non-Communist South Vietnam (under the present or a reformed GVN) of sufficient importance to the US that we should be prepared to continue our current effort for the next 3 to 5 years, or an escalated effort for 1-3 years?
2. If not, can we and should we seek to involve ourselves through negotiations in the creation of ^{a government based on some} ~~alternative~~ political compromise [~~government?~~] with the NLF?
3. If we wish to avoid imposing on ^{the GVN and} South Vietnam such a political compromise, could we negotiate with Hanoi the end of the phase of massive external military intervention which started in 1965?

1 of 6. 1

^{such} could we make other arrangements with Hanoi ^{be made without bringing} that would not bring about the collapse of the present GVN, but ~~would~~ permit a mutual withdrawal of forces?

U.S. and NVA

4. Given the success of our current military strategies, do we need to maintain current force levels (549,500 men in Vietnam) to continue present effectiveness, or can we maintain comparable fighting capability at a lower troop level?

considerably

5. Should we in any case firmly commit ourselves, accepting the attendant risks, to a continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces over the next several years in order to ~~both~~ reduce our own costs and to prod Saigon into negotiating with the NLF ~~while~~ taking the necessary steps to increase its own political and military effectiveness?

and meanwhile

both

We have said we would do whatever is needed.

I have visited SVN to determine what is needed.

More US combat troops are needed.

Why are they needed, now?

Who ~~will they combat~~ will they be fighting for?

Who will they be fighting?

What will they be fighting for?

Overall requirements.

SPEECH POINTS:

1. Our aim and intention remains what it has been under three Presidents: to provide whatever is necessary to assist South Vietnam in preserving its freedom.
2. It is now inescapably clear that ~~greater efforts are necessary~~, the current and unfolding situation makes necessary an enlarged commitment of US combat troops to SVN.
3. President Johnson has also pledged that "we would do only what is needed" to achieve that aim. The added measures we shall be taking meet that test also. Neither the GVN nor the USG were willing to see US troops committed to combat in SVN till absolutely necessary; in the eyes of both governments, that time has come.
likely
4. The/alternative to the prompt deployment of ~~and~~ US reinforcements would be the growing conviction by the DRV and VC, ~~having this summer that~~--and perhaps, the armed forces and public of SVN--that ~~this~~ a victory by the Hanoi-directed VC based on armed force and terrorism was inevitable and near. The current unwillingness of the DRV to enter discussions of a negotiated settlement guaranteeing the freedom and independence of SVN would be confirmed and extended indefinitely into the future. The ultimate requirements for achieving our aim would be even larger. Indeed, ~~failure of failure to meet the tests of this summer would pose a~~ if the VC continue their present strategy, the outcome of the military confrontation this summer could be decisive to the prospects of success.
5. It has been increasingly clear that the VC forces had built up, by infiltration and by forced draft in areas of their control, to levels that would enable them to hold the initiative in offensive actions against the ARVN and to inflict ~~heavy~~ destructive losses on isolated ARVN units: if they were willing--as they have rarely been willing in the past--to commit their regular troops to battle and to accept large casualties themselves. That is what the VC have now begun to do. They have been attacking, in many cases, in regimental strength. In order to inflict heavy losses on outnumbered ARVN units--over 2000 ARVN k KIA in May and June--the VC have been willing to suffer still ~~heavy~~ greater losses themselves at the hands of the ~~defenders~~ ARVN defenders and their US air support: over 5000 VC KIA in these same two months. The hope that makes those losses acceptable to the VC is clear: by inflicting piecemeal ~~defeat~~ tactical defeats on the ARVN, they hope finally to ~~break its offensive spirit and to~~ break its offensive spirit and will to fight. By the same means, and by increased terrorism both in the countryside and in the cities, they hope to crack the confidence of the SVN public in the ability of their government and armed forces to meet the VC challenge. The VC have chosen this as the summer of ~~decision~~ decision, the time to achieve--at whatever cost--a decisive shift in the balance of morale between the non-Communist majority of the population and the armed, insurgent minority whose success would impose, eventually, Communist dictatorship upon SVN. They have made it, inescapably, a summer of decision for the US. We shall not fail that test. We shall not wishfully ~~put off~~ put off recognizing that the demands upon us have gone up.

1. We have said we would do what is needed in SVN to assist them in maintaining their independence. (
2. More US troops are now needed.
3. They are needed because:
 - a. VC buildup.
 - b. VC monsoon offensive: willingness to commit, aims.
 - c. Inability of ARVN to stretch, or expand fast enough.
4. Need is urgent; outcome of monsoon confrontation may ultimately be decisive on morale; but need will remain for some time. To ensure ability to meet our worldwide responsibilities and alliance commitments, need to call up reserves and expand regular forces.
5. This calls for a significantly higher effort and higher sacrifice by the American people. This is the time to review why these efforts are justified: how our aims in SVN are related to our larger U.S. interests.
6. First, what is the nature of conflict in which our troops will be participating? Who will they be defending, and who will they be fighting? What will they be fighting for: in SVN, and in terms of the larger interests of the US?

7. In SVN, they will be helping to defend--alongside the ~~550,000~~ 550,000 SVN regular and paramilitary forces and police--the great majority of the people of SVN, who are not Communist, who do not want the Viet Cong to win, who do not want to be ruled like or by the Communist regime in the North.

--True of the major religious groups, the sects, the major factional groups: the Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the students, the unions, ~~the opposition~~ the armed forces;

--They would like the war to be over: but not at the price of a VC victory, that would bring a model of the Hanoi regime and eventually, domination by the Lao Dong Party, the Communist party of North Vietnam.

--They would like to see their country united, like the other divided countries of the world: but not at the price of...

--No government in Saigon has supported such a development.

No leader of any major group has done so.

No ~~single~~ figure of any public or political significance--whether sympathetic to or deeply critical of the Saigon government--has joined the VC. ~~The leaders of the so-called NLF are~~

~~Even~~ Even applies to many or most of these in areas now dominated by the VC; though in presence of VC regular units, assassination squads and guerrillas and a highly-organized system of informers there is no ~~in~~ way for them to register their protest except with their feet. 350,000 have come out of these areas as refugees; and there has been no such movement of villagers to VC-dominated areas.

Note: US commitment / whole subject in GUN.

Comm control (credit?)

Tactics (non-ideological)

kind of outside support

(maintaining
effects)

A whole range of US national interests involved in the independence of South Vietnam can be suggested by the various Communist interests in overthrowing it. To begin with, the rulers of the Communist state of North Vietnam wish to extend their ^{Party dictatorship} rule to the 14 million people of South Vietnam; and eventually to the 5 million people of Laos and Cambodia. ^{They and} The rulers of Communist China wish to see Thailand outflanked, subjected to the same pressures of subversion, terrorism, infiltration and guerrilla war, and added in turn to the Communist Bloc. They wish the same fate for the neighboring nations of Southeast and South Asia. ^{They are going far beyond the interests of Hanoi,} And they wish, in the ^{the Chinese} interests of increasing their prestige, influence and control in the ^{Communists} Communist Bloc and throughout the underdeveloped or vulnerable areas of the world, to demonstrate the invincibility of their tactics of ^{covert aggression} ~~subversive~~ ^{subversive} war; to undermine faith in the word, and the resolution, and the power of the United States as a guarantor; to show up the caution of the Soviet Union as ^{unvarnished and discreditable;} ~~craven~~; to demoralize potential victims and to win the active support of the opportunists. ^{It is strongly in the} It is a vital national interest of the United States to frustrate each one of these objectives. ^{wisely and together.}

I FACTS IN P.P. INDIVIDUALLY

facts on both sides

no facts could injure the U.S.
if taken individually

that jmt. was part of my decision
to copy

this was based on experiences
teaching me what nat'l. def

II FACTS IN PP AS A WHOLE

- vitally important lesson

- that the Exec. Branch had the
information all along

- quagmire theory + stalemate
machine

- no martyr

long
blinded

Unilateral
QUICK FULL WITHDRAWAL

This course involves U.S. public commitment and actions to withdraw all U.S. forces from SVN in one year whether or not an agreement is reached in Paris.

Beliefs *Advocates*
Assumptions of Proponents

1. The war is unwinnable.

by acceptable ways?
in 1 year?

a. No matter what statistics might indicate or official reporters feel, our efforts cannot in the next five years or more get at the political problems that are at the heart of this war.

b. We should, therefore, cut our losses while we can.

2. The Nixon Administration can successfully explain this course to the American people and to other nations.

a. The American public will be receptive both because many are disenchanted with the war and because U.S. domestic priorities require a quick full withdrawal.

(1) Public opinion has responded favorably to every peace move and every act of deescalation by the Johnson Administration.

b. Other nations will understand our actions because we can maintain convincingly that we have met our commitments to our SVN ally by the investment of 30,000 plus lives and the expenditure of \$100 billion.

3. It is important to start the withdrawal process now and complete it quickly because the longer the new Administration retains any forces, the more likely it is to assume an open-ended commitment.

a. It boils down to a choice of doing it now before the new Administration assumes the obligations of the old.

*Blame on
previous
Admin.*

. B Military Levels and Actions

1. U.S. forces are drawn down to zero on a crash basis.

a. Because of logistical problems this could well take more than one year, but we should aim hard at one.

2. We should immediately pull back our forces to base and embarkation areas.
3. U.S. turns over as much military equipment as GVN forces are able to use.
 - a. (If SVN forces could maintain their cohesion, this equipment would be of significant value.)

C Paris

1. U.S. tries to negotiate mutual withdrawals with possibility that Hanoi might be willing to save our face since we would in fact be withdrawing.
2. U.S. maintains a strong declaratory policy against NVN aggression and reaffirms U.S. interest in Asian nations willing to help themselves.

D GVN

1. Say that we have helped them directly as much as we can, and that we will continue to provide economic and military assistance.
 - a. We could keep small non-combat advisory group.
2. Apply no pressure for reforms and actions and be friendly toward what GVN says it wants to do.

E Cost

1. Fastest and cheapest way to approach 1964 levels of Defense expenditures, but still actual budgetary savings would take 1 to 2 years.
2. U.S. casualties go down to zero rapidly.

F Consequences

1. Probable collapse of present SVN and communist takeover, but some possibility of a non-communist coalition government.
 - a. SVN countryside quickly taken over by VC.
2. Paris Talks become much less important and are unlikely to lead to a negotiated settlement.
3. Initial concern on part of some Asian nations, but no domino process.
 - a. Laos would probably go communist quickly and Thais might hedge their ties with us.
4. Would be attacked domestically for a pull out, but cannot predict depth or dimensions.

IV. Negotiate Political Compromise

Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement that would make possible:

- a) a withdrawal of U.S. and NVN troops from South Vietnam;
- b) a policy of national reconciliation between all political forces present in South Vietnam including the NLF.

Beliefs of Advocates

1. There are sufficient elements of common interest among all South Vietnamese to warrant the search for a formula of political compromise that would create an independent, neutralist, state in the South supported by all its political forces.
2. There is sufficient interest among all Vietnamese, Communist and non-Communist, in the South as well as in the North, to secure the independence of their nation from American pressures, American

to continue negotiations as long as necessary without being forced into unwanted concessions or a hasty settlement by the impatience of the American people.

2. Continue reconnaissance operations and deployment of air and naval forces which would give weight to the threat that we will attack North Vietnam if they fail to make compromise stick.

Paris Negotiations

1. Negotiate mutual withdrawal of forces with DRV, on the basis of Article 29 of the Manila Declaration.
2. Encourage direct discussions between the GVN and the NLF concerning the terms of a political compromise (which would involve amendment of Article 4 of the 1967 Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam which prohibits Communism "in any form").
3. Offer suggestions for procedural safeguards concerning freedom of political expression, election rights of

2. Threaten GVN with withdrawal of U.S. support (which could immediately increase the likelihood of a coup against the present team) or even with unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam, if it does not negotiate in good faith with the NLF and obstructs our efforts to arrive at mutual withdrawal of U.S. and NVA forces from South Vietnam.

Cost

1. Decrease in financial cost over next twelve months depends on how force levels and patterns of military operations are adjusted.
2. Casualties may continue at current level (200 a week).

Consequences

1. Settlement may take more than 12-18 months, as progress in Paris could be painfully slow.
2. Major issues to be solved involve financial support to ARVN.

of the settlement, the Timing of each phase,
our willingness and ability to prevent
ARVN from collapsing, GVN capacity
to broaden its base and improve its
chances over the next twelve months,
the true extent of popular support for
the NLF (which cannot ~~be~~ really be
assessed under present conditions) and
the present situation.

Our outcome of US efforts would
create a new political atmosphere not only
in South Vietnam but isolated in all of Southeast
Asia. It may mean the end of Communist
attempts to gain control of unstable countries
through wars of national liberation and
promote the basis for meaningful regional
cooperation and even ideological brotherhoods.

2. Scenarios will center that an option based on a
containment of Communist aggression in Asia.
~~It would involve a centralizing policy of~~
~~major involvement of the American policy of~~
~~containment of Communist aggression in Asia.~~

one generation.
Even under the most favorable circumstances,
the counter revolution and the ~~major~~ policy
military maneuvers of the confounding factors
will bring us to remain involved at a high
level of budgetary effort for a period of between
1 and 3 years.

4. The compromise between the two would
~~probably lead eventually to a~~
~~Communist take-over of the military~~
This is and how soon it will take place very
unclear, depending in part on the present ~~not~~ future

A policy of national reconciliation in the immediate ^{unobtrusive} but if

aftermath of a lengthy and violent civil war is not likely to ^{become in such circumstances}

succeed ^{and} eventual reintegration of the national community

can only take place ~~in such circumstances~~ after the initial

victory of one side, followed in time by the growth of a new

spirit of mutual tolerance, a process that might take at least

The outcome of US efforts would create a new political atmosphere not only in South Vietnam but indeed in all of Southeast Asia. ~~It may mark the end of Communist attempts to gain control of unstable countries through "wars of national liberation" and provide the basis for meaningful regional cooperation across ideological ~~and~~ boundaries.~~ ~~It ~~is not~~ ~~an~~ ~~end~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~US~~ ~~policy~~ ~~of~~ ~~containment~~ ~~of~~ ~~Communism~~ ~~in~~ ~~Asia~~.~~ ~~It ~~is not~~ ~~an~~ ~~end~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~US~~ ~~policy~~ ~~of~~ ~~containment~~ ~~of~~ ~~Communism~~ ~~in~~ ~~Asia~~.~~

2. Sceptics will counter that an option based on a

one generation.

3. Even under ^{relatively} ~~the best~~ favorable assumptions, ~~the~~ complex negotiations and the ~~complex~~ politico-military maneuvers of the contending factions will oblige us to remain involved at a high level of budgetary effort for a period of between 1 and 3 years.

4. ~~The compromise political settlement ~~may~~ ~~will~~ ~~probably~~ ~~lead~~ ~~eventually~~ ~~ultimately~~ ~~to~~ ~~a~~ ~~Communist~~ ~~take-over~~ ~~estimation~~ of low likely.~~ This is and how soon it will take place vary widely, depending in part on the precise nature

A policy of national reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of a lengthy and violent civil war is not likely to succeed ^{unrealistic, but if} ^{because in such circumstances} ~~and~~ eventual reintegration of the national community can only take place ~~in such circumstances~~ after the initial victory of one side, followed in time by the growth of a new spirit of mutual tolerance, a process that might take at least

+V/+

IV. Negotiate Political Compromise

Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement that would make possible:

- a) a withdrawal of U.S. and NVN troops from South Vietnam;
- b) a policy of ~~national reconciliation~~ ^{peaceful competition among} between all political forces present in South Vietnam, including the NLF. This would involve either a coalition

8

government negotiated at the conference table,
prior to new elections in South Vietnam, or elections
~~on election~~ ~~process~~ under proper safeguards
the outcome of which may either lead to a
coalition government or to the acceptance
of the NLF as "loyal" opposition.

Beliefs of Advocates

1. There are sufficient elements of common interest among all South Vietnamese to warrant the search for a formula of political compromise² that would create an independent, neutralist, state in the South supported by ~~all~~ its ^{principal} political forces.
2. There is sufficient interest among all Vietnamese, Communist and non-Communist, in the South as well as in the North, to secure the independence of their nation from ~~all~~ pressures, ~~American, Chinese, Russian~~ plausible.

such purposes.

Use our leverage on GVN to induce rapidly a genuine policy of accommodation with all non-Communist political forces in South Vietnam, such as militant Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnards in order to broaden support for the GVN in its negotiations with the NLF. This policy of accommodation should become visible immediately in a reshuffled cabinet which would include public figures who have the confidence of the relevant political groups.

tested under

Hanoi's sense of timing

5. US will assume ~~continued~~ considerable responsibilities by pressing Saigon to accept a compromise and may have to extend massive support to the regime resulting from such a settlement.

Many contend that the probability of eventual Communist takeover resulting from such a settlement is not only high, but higher than from a settlement determined by the Vietnamese with no ~~other~~ direct US involvement. (Given the damage to GVN prestige

financial and logistic
to RVN before and possibly after settlement, extended
economic assistance to the GVN, and eventually perhaps to a
South Vietnam organized on lines repugnant to American public
opinion.

3. Political compromise, even if successfully negotiated,
does not eliminate:

- a) continued U.S. responsibility for maintaining political
arrangement negotiated through its active intervention;
- b) ultimate Communist take-over.

from all external
Soviet, Chinese, Russian or other, to make it
plausible that a well-conceived plan will obtain the support
of all Vietnamese political forces.

Beliefs of Opponents

1. A policy of national reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of a lengthy and violent civil war is not likely to succeed and eventual reintegration of the national community can only take place in such circumstances after the initial victory of one side, followed in time by the growth of a new spirit of mutual tolerance.

Military Activity in Support of Search for Compromise

1. Adjust force levels and pattern of military operations so as to make it possible for the President of the United States

concerning
...ctions, protection of the
...or political minorities, etc., and possibly American
assistance to international arrangements for such purposes.

Relations with GVN

1. Use our leverage on GVN to induce rapidly a genuine policy of accommodation with all non-Communist political forces in South Vietnam, such as militant Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnards in order to broaden support for the GVN in its negotiations with the NLF. This policy of accommodation should become visible immediately in a reshuffled cabinet which would include public figures who have the confidence of the relevant political groups.

IV/3

Complete

2. Threaten GVN with withdrawal of U.S. support (which ^{^ raise the specter} could immediately ~~increase the likelihood~~ of a coup against the present team) or even with unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam, if it does not negotiate in good faith with the NLF and obstructs our efforts to arrive at mutual withdrawal of U.S. and NVA forces from South Vietnam.

Costs

- After the political settlement is agreed, a ceasefire would probably*
- ~~1. Decrease in financial cost over next twelve months depends on how force levels and patterns of military operations are adjusted.~~ *result, which together with US withdrawal, would reduce costs rapidly (say by 15 billion).*
 - ~~2. Casualties may continue at current level (200 a week) which~~

Consequences

and budget cuts

Comprom

to continue negotiations as long as necessary without being forced into unwanted concessions or a hasty settlement by the impatience of the American people.

2. Continue reconnaissance operations and deployment of air and naval forces which would give weight to the threat that we will attack North Vietnam if they fail to make ^{the} compromise stick.

Paris Negotiations

1. Negotiate mutual withdrawal of forces with DRV, on the basis of Article 29 of the Manila Declaration.
2. Encourage direct discussions between the GVN and the NLF concerning the terms of a political compromise (which would involve amendment of Article 4 of the 1967 Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam which prohibits Communism "in any form").
3. Offer suggestions for procedural safeguards concerning freedom of political expression, elections, protection of the rights of political minorities, etc., and possibly American assistance to international arrangements for

Relations with GVN

1. II

3. US active participation in the search for a political solution through negotiations in Paris is likely to result in ~~the~~ more satisfactory results ~~political solution~~ than if the Vietnamese were left to settle the ~~the~~ conflict on their own. The expected outcome of ~~the~~ ^{US} efforts outweighs the risks involved in the US ~~assuming~~ greater responsibility for the immediate settlement and ~~the~~ ^{indirectly for} later developments ~~which~~ ^{will place the} ~~onus of having "lost~~ ^{South Vietnam" on the US,} ~~may result therefrom.~~

Military Activity in Support of Search for Compromise

1. Adjust force levels and pattern of military operations so as to make it possible for the ~~President of the United States~~ *US*